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SEANA SHIFFRIN’S THINKER-BASED 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A RESPONSE 
Vincent Blasi* 
As an instinctive consequentialist so far as First 
Amendment theory is concerned, I have to admit that I have 
never been so tempted by a non-consequentialist account as I am 
by what Professor Shiffrin has produced. My principal interest is 
the history of ideas regarding the freedom of speech. I have long 
been struck by how so many of the canonical writers on the 
subject have built their arguments from the starting point of the 
central importance of the freedom of thought. This is true of 
Milton1 and Mill2 in a basic, explicit, straightforward way (if 
Milton can ever be called “straightforward”), and of Holmes,3 
Brandeis,4 and Meiklejohn5 in more complicated (and 
disputable) ways. Of the major Anglo-American theorists of free 
speech, only Madison and Learned Hand do not glorify the 
independent-minded individual thinker, but they both rest their 
arguments for free speech on the central importance of 
meaningful political consent.6 So I think Shiffrin’s project fits 
well with the inheritance, if that matters. 
I also think that she has done an excellent job of explaining 
how the shift of emphasis that she urges has significant 
implications for doctrinal structure and priorities, as well as for 
 
 *  Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School. 
 1. See John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing 
(1644), in 2 THE COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 485, 560 (Ernest Sirluck 
ed., 1959). 
 2. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82 (David Bromwich & George Kateb 
ed., 2003). 
 3. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls 
for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for 
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”) 
 4. See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 5. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 8–28 (1960). 
 6. See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in JAMES MADISON, 
WRITINGS 608, 652–53 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 
535, 540 (1917) (Hand, J.). 
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justifying particular case outcomes such as Barnette7 and casting 
doubt on others (Virginia Board of Pharmacy8? Citizens 
United9?) Moreover, I find convincing several of her arguments 
regarding how her version of an autonomy theory of free speech 
has certain advantages over rival autonomy accounts. 
I have two misgivings. The first relates to the kind of person 
who would benefit most from the freedom that Shiffrin’s 
intriguing version of autonomy is designed to advance. One of 
the attractive features of the conventional arguments for free 
speech from autonomy—arguments centered on notions such as 
dignity, decency, and consent; arguments largely about human 
beings being treated as ends not means—is that all persons 
benefit from having their autonomy respected, and benefit in 
roughly similar ways. In shifting the focus from speaking and 
listening to thinking, Shiffrin’s novel autonomy argument may 
sacrifice that advantage to a degree. My second misgiving relates 
to her persuasive claim that the understanding of autonomy that 
she offers provides a more comprehensive, unified foundation 
for the protection of speech than is provided by rival versions of 
the argument from autonomy. I wonder whether having such a 
comprehensive, unified foundation is highly desirable, as she 
assumes. I should say at the outset that I consider my second 
misgiving the more significant of the two. 
My first misgiving bears a resemblance to a problem that 
some readers have with Mill.10 After sketching his paragon of the 
truly open-minded thinker, tolerant yet passionate and 
committed, courageously ready to follow his intellect wherever it 
leads him, if necessary willing to defy convention and proceed 
alone in the face of scorn, Mill announces that: 
Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that 
freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as 
much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human 
beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of.11 
Missing from his account, however, is an explanation of how 
“average human beings” are to achieve the breadth of 
understanding and empathy and the degree of self-discipline 
 
 7. West Virginia Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 8. Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
 9. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 10. See EDWARD ALEXANDER, MATHEW ARNOLD & JOHN STUART MILL 129 
(1965); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 67–73 (1967). 
 11. MILL, supra note 2, at 102. 
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necessary to meet Mill’s demanding standard of fully engaged 
open-mindedness. Much as he sincerely desires to “raise[] even 
persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity 
of thinking beings,”12 the question persists whether the freedom 
that Mill defends is of much greater value to people like himself 
and his ilk than to other persons whose abilities, aspirations, and 
patterns of living are less remarkable or differently directed. 
Clearly Shiffrin believes that the thinker-oriented freedom 
she defends is of great value to persons with no intellectual 
pretensions, persons who simply need to think in order to figure 
out how to survive, hopefully flourish, do their moral duty, and 
be recognized for who they are by cohorts who may not value 
intellectual achievement at all. But is she right? Of course such 
people need to think. And of course such people deserve, as a 
basic moral proposition, some measure of respect for their 
humanity, dignity, and desire for self-authorship. The question is 
whether for their flourishing and recognition they need to 
develop, as fully and freely as Shiffrin believes is required, the 
particular capacities that her thinker-centered conception of the 
freedom of speech privileges. 
Because she is making a non-consequentialist argument, 
Shiffrin has a more demanding burden of persuasion on this 
point than Mill, who claims that his argument ultimately rests on 
collective consequences, “the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being.”13 The reason he gives for wanting to raise 
persons of ordinary intellect to the ranks of thinking beings is 
because his reading of history tells him that only in the 
atmosphere of “an intellectually active people”14 do 
improvements “in the human mind or in institutions”15 occur. If 
Mill is right about this, if broad-based intellectual independence 
and energy is valuable primarily for its contribution to the 
collective benefit of “progress,” we all gain from the freedom of 
thought, at least indirectly. That is true even for those of us who 
do not value or practice the intellectual skills that a robust 
protection for the freedom of speech can help to develop. 
Consequentialist arguments of a different stripe, resting on such 
collective goods as political stability (Madison),16 adaptability 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 81. 
 14. Id. at 102. 
 15. Id. at 103. 
 16. See Madison, supra note 6, at 631–58.  
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(Holmes)17, or the discharge of political responsibility 
(Brandeis,18 Meiklejohn19) share the feature of attempting to 
protect and promote something that almost all persons value and 
have a stake in. So also does the “more is always better” listener-
centered argument, recently in vogue in First Amendment 
thought, that any raw, quantitative increase in the fund of public 
communication is salutary without regard to calculations of 
utility, integrity, quality, or just distribution, simply because 
various people can draw on that fund in selective, multifarious, 
unpredictable ways.20 
So my question is: why should we believe that persons other 
than intellectuals, reformers, students, and artists would benefit 
directly, in a manner that bears on their personal autonomy, 
from a First Amendment that is designed to place the emphasis 
on thinking rather than speaking and/or listening? Can it be that 
for most persons the development of the mental capacities on 
which Shiffrin bases her theory is as important as, say, respect 
for their dignity or enrichment of the menu of choices available 
to them as self-authoring individuals? Perhaps her implicit 
contention is that vigorous support for the development of those 
mental capacities actually is the key to respecting dignity and 
enriching the experience of choice, not just for persons with 
certain skills and interests but for all persons. For that to be true, 
however, the capacities that Shiffrin invokes cannot be too 
demanding or too specialized lest the benefits of her version of 
autonomy be concentrated on a favored class of citizens. 
As someone who has both taught a course and co-authored 
an article with her,21 I am the last person who would suspect 
Seana Shiffrin of constructing a social or moral argument with 
insufficient attention to the needs of ordinary persons. She is 
careful to specify that she values the freedom of speech not only 
for its contribution to the development of rational capacities but also 
“emotional capacities,” “perceptual capacities,” and “capacities 
of sentience,”22 all of which, she claims, require for their develop-
 
 17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See 
also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24–33, 
44–46 (2005). 
 18. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 19. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5, at 8–28. 
 20. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–08 (2010). 
 21. Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 22. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech,  27 
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ment “the ability to transmit the contents of one’s mind to 
others.”23 Moreover, when she speaks of “intellectual capacities” 
she includes exercises of the imagination and “the intellectual 
prerequisites of moral relations,”24 so she has in mind capacities 
desired and possessed by persons who in no way consider 
themselves intellectuals. 
That said, her argument depends heavily on a claim about 
how “external representation” aids the development of “a 
complex mental world,” “sufficiently complex ideas,” and 
“complex thought.”25 Now, persons who possess “ordinary” 
mental abilities and who live “ordinary” lives no doubt have to 
grapple with various complexities. Their personal challenges and 
constraints are laced with contingencies, their thoughts and 
desires and commitments and resentments are layered. But in 
learning to cope with the complexities they confront, do most 
people really need to nurture the particular mental capacities 
that Shiffrin places at the center of her thinker-based theory? I 
wonder. The skills of articulate self-presentation, inquisitive and 
empathetic observation, and undistorted introspection that she 
privileges strike me as disproportionately useful to persons of an 
unusually imaginative or ruminative or provocative bent. In that 
respect, Shiffrin’s autonomy argument grounded in mental 
development seems to me less attractive on distributional 
grounds than the conventional autonomy accounts that look 
more to decency, dignity, consent, and opportunities for choice, 
and that take people as they are. 
I concede that the factor of how broadly distributed are the 
benefits that are ascribed to free speech under various rationales 
is a problematic basis for comparing theories. Distributional 
concerns have almost never figured prominently in theoretical 
inquiry about the freedom of speech, and for good reason. It is 
all but impossible to measure in a meaningful way how the 
benefits of free speech are distributed. Nevertheless, I think it is 
worth raising distributional suspicions, even if one ought to be 
loath to give them much weight for lack of feasible verification. I 
might add that distributional concerns, should they be taken into 
account, are more threatening to an autonomy argument than to 
one based on collective consequences because autonomy by 
 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011). 
 23. Id. at 291. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 292. 
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definition is about what individuals have in common by virtue of 
their humanity. 
Where Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach does not raise 
distributional concerns is in the way she builds upon the value of 
sincerity. All of us, whatever our abilities, whether we are by 
nature deliberative or instinctive, passive or proactive, patient or 
impulsive, gregarious or reclusive, loquacious or reticent, need 
to develop the discipline to mean what we say—to ourselves as 
well as to others. Whether a well-established and fully enforced 
principle of freedom of thought does much to promote the virtue 
of sincerity is debatable. Are Americans more sincere in 
personal relations, or in self-examination, than the Chinese or 
the Cubans? Legal protection for heretical ideas can engender 
disputational energy in a population. It can help to make 
powerful actors accountable. But inducing or enabling people to 
eschew dissembling, trimming, equivocating, and exaggerating is 
an altogether more ambitious objective for a legal regime. Were 
that objective to be realized, however, even in modest measure, 
Professor Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to the freedom of 
speech would have a distributional bona fides worthy of an 
autonomy argument. All of us would benefit, and in the same 
ways. 
My second misgiving relates to Shiffrin’s claim that a 
thinker-based rationale offers a “more comprehensive, unified 
foundation for much of the freedom of speech protection than is 
yielded by starting from a more partial intermediate point.”26 
Why exactly are the developmental objectives that she 
emphasizes more foundational? Presumably the answer is that 
the other goods (both individual and collective) that one might 
invoke to justify a robust freedom of speech, whether respect for 
the dignity of persons, or resources for listeners exercising 
choice, or progress, or the prevention of political enormities, or 
the satisfactions of participation, all depend on the ability of 
individuals to respond to reasons and facts, apprehend what is 
true, exercise their imaginations, practice moral agency, be 
authentic, live among others, etc.27 True, but then I want to know 
why being foundational in this sense is such a recommendation. 
Does the fact that lots of different goods depend on the thinking 
capacities that Shiffrin describes make freedoms directly related 
to those capacities ipso facto more important than other 
 
 26. Id. at 288. 
 27. Id. at 288–291. 
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(perhaps more narrowly tailored) freedoms that relate only to 
capacities of a more specialized sort (say, political capacities or 
the ability to energize others) that come into play at a later point 
in the chain of inference? 
To my mind, that the narrower capacities further down the 
chain are not foundational but rather are targeted to serve 
specific objectives counts in their favor. This is because the 
larger project, as I see it, is one of identifying a limited number 
of liberties that might properly constrain the majority will and 
that can be robustly protected without extracting too great a cost 
in terms of the multifarious social goods that free speech 
inevitably impinges upon. It seems evident that a system of 
constitutional protections keyed to the nourishing of specialized 
capacities will occupy a narrower footprint, and thus impose 
fewer social costs, than will a more ambitious, comprehensive 
system of protections focused on foundational capacities. 
Admittedly, an autonomy theory is not committed to counting 
the costs in the way that a consequentialist theory is. But that 
hardly means that an understanding of the freedom of speech 
should be preferred on the ground that its implications, some of 
which entail the imposition of social costs, are broader. 
When Shiffrin contrasts the foundational and the 
intermediate she is referring not only to the difference between 
“comprehensive” capacities and more specialized ones, but also 
between goods that are intrinsically valuable and those that are 
only instrumentally so, such that the latter type of good depends 
on an empirical connection that might be disputed and certainly 
is contingent. She asserts that “[a] good free speech theory 
should identify a non-contingent and direct foundation for its 
protection.”28 Perhaps we can say that the free and full 
development of the mental capacities on which she builds her 
argument is self-evidently good and also self-evidently advanced 
by the kinds of free speech rights she derives from her argument, 
while the justifications for a robust freedom of speech offered by 
the likes of Milton, Madison, Mill, Holmes, and Brandeis depend 
on empirical, and even normative, claims relating to collective 
consequences that are far more dubious and certainly more 
time-bound. I do confess to being nervous about my 
consequentialist inclinations on just this score. On the other 
hand, some consequentialist claims are more controversial than 
others. Those advanced by Madison relating to the prevention of 
 
 28. Id. at 286. 
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major political transgressions and by Holmes relating to the 
value of adaptation to an ever-changing environment seem to 
me to rival, on the score of normative appeal and enduring 
empirical grounding, the claims on which Shiffrin builds her 
theory. I remain puzzled why, in the domain of free speech 
theory, “contingent” should function as an epithet, even as I 
understand why “speculative” should. 
Shiffrin also defines “foundational” to mean that among the 
various forms of expression that she lists (dissent, religious 
speech, fiction, art, music, diaries, etc.) “there should not be a 
lexical hierarchy of value.”29 She wishes to “avoid the 
convolutions” that complicate any First Amendment analysis 
that employs hierarchies of value and attends to contingencies.30 
I sympathize with her desire. The passage of almost thirty years 
has done nothing to discredit William Van Alstyne’s observation 
in 1982 that First Amendment doctrine was becoming as 
complicated as the Internal Revenue Code.31 My own belief that 
the First Amendment should be outfitted to do service in 
pathological periods led me on one occasion to extol the virtues 
of doctrinal simplicity on grounds of strategic efficacy.32 But 
Shiffrin’s desire to minimize hierarchy and contingency in free 
speech theory seems to be based on deeper concerns. And she is 
not alone. As Robert Post has noted, in modern times we have 
witnessed what might be called the “speech as such” 
movement.33 There seems to be a powerful desire to embrace 
formal rather than functional criteria in delineating the ambit of 
First Amendment concern. I certainly don’t want to libel 
Professor Shiffrin by calling her a formalist, but I do think that 
she needs to say more, in a functionalist vein, to justify her 
assertion that a thinker-based view of the First Amendment is to 
be preferred in part because it leads to both a more unitary and 
less contingent set of doctrines and case outcomes. 
I suppose my various misgivings all come down to the crude 
belief that, except in periods and places of rare societal self-
confidence, the gesture of protecting threatening or infuriating 
acts of communication is difficult to pull off. In this view, the 
 
 29. Id. at 285. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 309 (1983) (reporting a private conversation with Van Alstyne).  
 32. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). 
 33. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1249, 1279 (1995). 
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First Amendment is strong medicine that needs, like antibiotics, 
to be rationed. That makes me suspicious of foundationalism 
and attracted to an instrumentalist approach that emphasizes 
priorities and practicalities. 
 
